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To the People of the State of New York:
To THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government, in respect to the creation and direction
of the national forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is this, that proper
provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace; an objection which, I shall
now endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations.
It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form, supported only by bold assertions,
without the appearance of argument; without even the sanction of theoretical opinions; in contradiction to the
practice of other free nations, and to the general sense of America, as expressed in most of the existing
constitutions. The proprietory of this remark will appear, the moment it is recollected that the objection under
consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the LEGISLATIVE authority of the nation, in the
article of military establishments; a principle unheard of, except in one or two of our State constitutions, and
rejected in all the rest.
A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the present juncture, without having previously
inspected the plan reported by the convention, would be naturally led to one of two conclusions: either that it
contained a positive injunction, that standing armies should be kept up in time of peace; or that it vested in the
EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying troops, without subjecting his discretion, in any shape, to the control of
the legislature.
If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be surprised to discover, that neither the one nor the
other was the case; that the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the LEGISLATURE, not in the
EXECUTIVE; that this legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people
periodically elected; and that instead of the provision he had supposed in favor of standing armies, there was to be
found, in respect to this object, an important qualification even of the legislative discretion, in that clause which
forbids the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer period than two years a precaution
which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear to be a great and real security against the keeping up of troops without
evident necessity.
Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed would be apt to pursue his conjectures a little further.
He would naturally say to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement and pathetic declamation can be without
some colorable pretext. It must needs be that this people, so jealous of their liberties, have, in all the preceding
models of the constitutions which they have established, inserted the most precise and rigid precautions on this
point, the omission of which, in the new plan, has given birth to all this apprehension and clamor.
If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the several State constitutions, how great would be his
disappointment to find that TWO ONLY of them [1] contained an interdiction of standing armies in time of peace;
that the other eleven had either observed a profound silence on the subject, or had in express terms admitted the
right of the Legislature to authorize their existence.
Still, however he would be persuaded that there must be some plausible foundation for the cry raised on this head.
He would never be able to imagine, while any source of information remained unexplored, that it was nothing more
than an experiment upon the public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention to deceive, or by the
overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous. It would probably occur to him, that he would be likely to
find the precautions he was in search of in the primitive compact between the States. Here, at length, he would
expect to meet with a solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to himself, the existing Confederation
must contain the most explicit provisions against military establishments in time of peace; and a departure from this
model, in a favorite point, has occasioned the discontent which appears to influence these political champions.
If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of the articles of Confederation, his astonishment
would not only be increased, but would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the unexpected discovery, that these
articles, instead of containing the prohibition he looked for, and though they had, with jealous circumspection,
restricted the authority of the State legislatures in this particular, had not imposed a single restraint on that of the
United States. If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility, or ardent temper, he could now no longer refrain
from regarding these clamors as the dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposition to a plan which
ought at least to receive a fair and candid examination from all sincere lovers of their country! How else, he would
say, could the authors of them have been tempted to vent such loud censures upon that plan, about a point in
which it seems to have conformed itself to the general sense of America as declared in its different forms of
government, and in which it has even superadded a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them? If, on the
contrary, he happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of
human nature, and would lament, that in a matter so interesting to the happiness of millions, the true merits of the
question should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right determination.
Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking, that a conduct of this kind has too much the appearance of an
intention to mislead the people by alarming their passions, rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to
their understandings.
But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by precedents among ourselves, it may be
satisfactory to take a nearer view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will appear that restraints upon
the discretion of the legislature in respect to military establishments in time of peace, would be improper to be
imposed, and if imposed, from the necessities of society, would be unlikely to be observed.
Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there are various considerations that warn us
against an excess of confidence or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are growing
settlements subject to the dominion of Britain. On the other side, and extending to meet the British settlements, are
colonies and establishments subject to the dominion of Spain. This situation and the vicinity of the West India
Islands, belonging to these two powers create between them, in respect to their American possessions and in
relation to us, a common interest. The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as our natural
enemies, their natural allies, because they have most to fear from us, and most to hope from them. The
improvements in the art of navigation have, as to the facility of communication, rendered distant nations, in a great
measure, neighbors. Britain and Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. A future concert of
views between these nations ought not to be regarded as improbable. The increasing remoteness of consanguinity
is every day diminishing the force of the family compact between France and Spain. And politicians have ever with
great reason considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious links of political connection. These
circumstances combined, admonish us not to be too sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach
of danger.
Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a constant necessity for keeping small
garrisons on our Western frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if it should
only be against the ravages and depredations of the Indians. These garrisons must either be furnished by
occasional detachments from the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the government. The first is
impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged
from their occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in times of profound peace. And if they
could be prevailed upon or compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation of service, and the loss
of labor and disconcertion of the industrious pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive objections to the
scheme. It would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to private citizens. The latter resource of
permanent corps in the pay of the government amounts to a standing army in time of peace; a small one, indeed,
but not the less real for being small. Here is a simple view of the subject, that shows us at once the impropriety of
a constitutional interdiction of such establishments, and the necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and
prudence of the legislature.
In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it may be said certain, that Britain and Spain would
augment their military establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be willing to be exposed, in a naked
and defenseless condition, to their insults and encroachments, we should find it expedient to increase our frontier
garrisons in some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements might be annoyed. There are, and will be,
particular posts, the possession of which will include the command of large districts of territory, and facilitate future
invasions of the remainder. It may be added that some of those posts will be keys to the trade with the Indian
nations. Can any man think it would be wise to leave such posts in a situation to be at any instant seized by one or
the other of two neighboring and formidable powers? To act this part would be to desert all the usual maxims of
prudence and policy.
If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as
possible, to have a navy. To this purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals; and for the defense of these,
fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a nation has become so powerful by sea that it can protect its
dock-yards by its fleets, this supersedes the necessity of garrisons for that purpose; but where naval
establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons will, in all likelihood, be found an indispensable security
against descents for the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards, and sometimes of the fleet itself.
PUBLIUS.
1. This statement of the matter is taken from the printed collection of State constitutions. Pennsylvania and North
Carolina are the two which contain the interdiction in these words: "As standing armies in time of peace are
dangerous to liberty, THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up." This is, in truth, rather a CAUTION than a
PROHIBITION. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland have, in each of their bils of rights, a
clause to this effect: "Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up WITHOUT
THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE"; which is a formal admission of the authority of the Legislature.
New York has no bills of rights, and her constitution says not a word about the matter. No bills of rights appear
annexed to the constitutions of the other States, except the foregoing, and their constitutions are equally silent. I am
told, however that one or two States have bills of rights which do not appear in this collection; but that those also
recognize the right of the legislative authority in this respect.
To THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government, in respect to the creation and direction
of the national forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is this, that proper
provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace; an objection which, I shall
now endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations.
It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form, supported only by bold assertions,
without the appearance of argument; without even the sanction of theoretical opinions; in contradiction to the
practice of other free nations, and to the general sense of America, as expressed in most of the existing
constitutions. The proprietory of this remark will appear, the moment it is recollected that the objection under
consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the LEGISLATIVE authority of the nation, in the
article of military establishments; a principle unheard of, except in one or two of our State constitutions, and
rejected in all the rest.
A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the present juncture, without having previously
inspected the plan reported by the convention, would be naturally led to one of two conclusions: either that it
contained a positive injunction, that standing armies should be kept up in time of peace; or that it vested in the
EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying troops, without subjecting his discretion, in any shape, to the control of
the legislature.
If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be surprised to discover, that neither the one nor the
other was the case; that the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the LEGISLATURE, not in the
EXECUTIVE; that this legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people
periodically elected; and that instead of the provision he had supposed in favor of standing armies, there was to be
found, in respect to this object, an important qualification even of the legislative discretion, in that clause which
forbids the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer period than two years a precaution
which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear to be a great and real security against the keeping up of troops without
evident necessity.
Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed would be apt to pursue his conjectures a little further.
He would naturally say to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement and pathetic declamation can be without
some colorable pretext. It must needs be that this people, so jealous of their liberties, have, in all the preceding
models of the constitutions which they have established, inserted the most precise and rigid precautions on this
point, the omission of which, in the new plan, has given birth to all this apprehension and clamor.
If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the several State constitutions, how great would be his
disappointment to find that TWO ONLY of them [1] contained an interdiction of standing armies in time of peace;
that the other eleven had either observed a profound silence on the subject, or had in express terms admitted the
right of the Legislature to authorize their existence.
Still, however he would be persuaded that there must be some plausible foundation for the cry raised on this head.
He would never be able to imagine, while any source of information remained unexplored, that it was nothing more
than an experiment upon the public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention to deceive, or by the
overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous. It would probably occur to him, that he would be likely to
find the precautions he was in search of in the primitive compact between the States. Here, at length, he would
expect to meet with a solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to himself, the existing Confederation
must contain the most explicit provisions against military establishments in time of peace; and a departure from this
model, in a favorite point, has occasioned the discontent which appears to influence these political champions.
If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of the articles of Confederation, his astonishment
would not only be increased, but would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the unexpected discovery, that these
articles, instead of containing the prohibition he looked for, and though they had, with jealous circumspection,
restricted the authority of the State legislatures in this particular, had not imposed a single restraint on that of the
United States. If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility, or ardent temper, he could now no longer refrain
from regarding these clamors as the dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposition to a plan which
ought at least to receive a fair and candid examination from all sincere lovers of their country! How else, he would
say, could the authors of them have been tempted to vent such loud censures upon that plan, about a point in
which it seems to have conformed itself to the general sense of America as declared in its different forms of
government, and in which it has even superadded a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them? If, on the
contrary, he happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of
human nature, and would lament, that in a matter so interesting to the happiness of millions, the true merits of the
question should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right determination.
Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking, that a conduct of this kind has too much the appearance of an
intention to mislead the people by alarming their passions, rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to
their understandings.
But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by precedents among ourselves, it may be
satisfactory to take a nearer view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will appear that restraints upon
the discretion of the legislature in respect to military establishments in time of peace, would be improper to be
imposed, and if imposed, from the necessities of society, would be unlikely to be observed.
Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there are various considerations that warn us
against an excess of confidence or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are growing
settlements subject to the dominion of Britain. On the other side, and extending to meet the British settlements, are
colonies and establishments subject to the dominion of Spain. This situation and the vicinity of the West India
Islands, belonging to these two powers create between them, in respect to their American possessions and in
relation to us, a common interest. The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as our natural
enemies, their natural allies, because they have most to fear from us, and most to hope from them. The
improvements in the art of navigation have, as to the facility of communication, rendered distant nations, in a great
measure, neighbors. Britain and Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. A future concert of
views between these nations ought not to be regarded as improbable. The increasing remoteness of consanguinity
is every day diminishing the force of the family compact between France and Spain. And politicians have ever with
great reason considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious links of political connection. These
circumstances combined, admonish us not to be too sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach
of danger.
Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a constant necessity for keeping small
garrisons on our Western frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if it should
only be against the ravages and depredations of the Indians. These garrisons must either be furnished by
occasional detachments from the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the government. The first is
impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged
from their occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in times of profound peace. And if they
could be prevailed upon or compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation of service, and the loss
of labor and disconcertion of the industrious pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive objections to the
scheme. It would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to private citizens. The latter resource of
permanent corps in the pay of the government amounts to a standing army in time of peace; a small one, indeed,
but not the less real for being small. Here is a simple view of the subject, that shows us at once the impropriety of
a constitutional interdiction of such establishments, and the necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and
prudence of the legislature.
In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it may be said certain, that Britain and Spain would
augment their military establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be willing to be exposed, in a naked
and defenseless condition, to their insults and encroachments, we should find it expedient to increase our frontier
garrisons in some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements might be annoyed. There are, and will be,
particular posts, the possession of which will include the command of large districts of territory, and facilitate future
invasions of the remainder. It may be added that some of those posts will be keys to the trade with the Indian
nations. Can any man think it would be wise to leave such posts in a situation to be at any instant seized by one or
the other of two neighboring and formidable powers? To act this part would be to desert all the usual maxims of
prudence and policy.
If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as
possible, to have a navy. To this purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals; and for the defense of these,
fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a nation has become so powerful by sea that it can protect its
dock-yards by its fleets, this supersedes the necessity of garrisons for that purpose; but where naval
establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons will, in all likelihood, be found an indispensable security
against descents for the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards, and sometimes of the fleet itself.
PUBLIUS.
1. This statement of the matter is taken from the printed collection of State constitutions. Pennsylvania and North
Carolina are the two which contain the interdiction in these words: "As standing armies in time of peace are
dangerous to liberty, THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up." This is, in truth, rather a CAUTION than a
PROHIBITION. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland have, in each of their bils of rights, a
clause to this effect: "Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up WITHOUT
THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE"; which is a formal admission of the authority of the Legislature.
New York has no bills of rights, and her constitution says not a word about the matter. No bills of rights appear
annexed to the constitutions of the other States, except the foregoing, and their constitutions are equally silent. I am
told, however that one or two States have bills of rights which do not appear in this collection; but that those also
recognize the right of the legislative authority in this respect.
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